

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 L-03

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PRS-01 DRC-01 /071 W

----- 051091

R 211311Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3882

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

CJCS

CINCPAC

COMUSSAG

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 PHNOM PENH 12869

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, CB

SUBJ: RALLIER ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA

1. SUMMARY: FANK'S DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND INTERNAL POLITICAL COMPETITION WITHIN THE GKR HAS CREATED AN UNFAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR A NATIONAL RALLIER PROGRAM. EFFORTS TO STIMULATE LARGE SCALE RALLYING HAVE THUS FAR CONTAINED MORE THAN A LITTLE CHICANERY AND FRAUD, AND WE CANNOT DOCUMENT A GENUINE CASE DURING THE PAST YEAR WHEN A SIZEABLE ENEMY UNIT HAS RALLIED EN MASSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ATTRACTING AND EXPLOITING INDIVIDUAL RALLIERS.

2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE POINTLESS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE AND ASSIST A NATIONAL RALLIER PROGRAM OF SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTIONS. RATHER OUR EFFORTS SHOULD BE TO HELP THE KHMER TO SHIFT FROM THEIR PRRSENT DIFFUSE AND INOPERATIVE "RALLY THE NATION" CONCEPT TO ONE CONCENTRATING ON INDIVIDUAL MILITARY PERSONNEL ON THE OTHER SIDE WHO ARE EITHER OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST OR WHO CAN BE

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RECRUITED INTO THE FANK. THE FOCUS OF SUCH AN EFFORT

SHOULD BE AT PROVINCIAL RATHER THAN NATIONAL LEVEL, ALTHOUGH A MODEST CENTRAL BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT WILL BE REQUIRED. BEST AGENCY FOR THIS PROGRAM WILL APPEAR TO BE THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR RATHER THAN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL CONCORD, AND THE LATTER COULD APPROPRIATELY BE WOUND UP. NON-MILITARY RALLIERS ARE BETTER HANDLED AS REFUGEES AND SHOULD BE ASSISTED BY THE NEW REFUGEE ORGANIZATION WE HOPE THE GKR WILL CREATE. OUR ROLE SHOULD BE:

(A) TO HELP THE GKR SORT OUT ITS CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE;

(B) TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT HIGHLY FOCUSSED TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS RELATED RALLYING; AND

(C) TO HELP THE KHMER VERIFY THE BONA FIDES OF ENEMY UNITS OR LEADERS SEEKING NEGOTIATION. END SUMMARY

3. THE CLIMATE FOR RALLIER PROGRAMS. NO SUBJECT TOUCHES CLOSER TO THE HEART OF POLITICS IN CAMBODIA THAN THE RALLYING OF KHMER TO THE REPUBLIC. EVERY POLITICIAN QUITE CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT THE MUST PROVE HIMSELF A MAGNET FOR RALLIERS IF HE IS TO HAVE ANY FUTURE IN CAMBODIA. MOST ALSO UNREALISTICALLY ENVISAGE RALLYING AS A PATH TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT, AND THUS A DETERMINANT OF THE POST-WAR POLITICAL ORDER. ANYTHING OF SUCH HIGH POLITICAL VALUE IN CAMBODIA ALSO HAS A MONETARY VALUE. AS A RESULT SHARPS AS WELL AS POLITICIANS ARE DRAWN TO THE RALLYING GAME. THE FIRST MINISTER FOR RALLIERS, BG LON NON, WHO IS PERHAPS BOTH, DEMONSTRATED WHERE THIS CAN LEAD: FAKE RALLIERS, FAKE CEREMONIES, FAKE BUDGET REQUESTS.

4. SINCE LON NON'S HIGLY TOUTED BUT ABORTED RALLIER DRIVE (SEE PHNOM PENH 3016), THE MILITARY SITUATION HAS CHANGED FOR THE WORSE. HIS RALLIER RESETTLEMENT AREA AT TRAM KHNR, FOR EXAMPLE, IS NOW IN ENEMY HANDS. WITH THE FALL OF A NUMBER OF OTHER OUTPOSTS AND THE SHRINKING OF THE PHNOM PENH PERIMETER, POTENTIAL RALLIERS HAVE FEWER POINTS AT WHICH TO "CROSS OVER." THE KC HIGH COMMAND'S CONTROL OVER ITS UNITS ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHENED OVER THE MONTHS. MORE IMPORTANT,

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PERHAPS, UNCERTAINTIES OVER THE FANK'S ABILITY TO PROTECT THE TERRITORY IT NOW HOLDS CREATE PSYCHOLOGICAL INHIBITIONS TO RALLYING.

5. IN SHORT, THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT IS NOT FAVORABLE TO A NATION-WIDE RALLIER PROGRAM SUCH AS LON NON AND OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE PROPOSED. EFFORTS BY THE FANK AND PROVINCIAL

AUTHORITIES TO ATTRACT AND UTILIZE INDIVIDUAL RALLIERS  
SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE CONTINUED AND, IN SOME INSTANCES, EXPANDED.  
THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS WHAT IS NOW BEING DONE IN THIS FIELD  
AND POINTS OUT AREAS WHERE THE U.S. MISSION CAN ASSIST.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 L-03

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PRS-01 DRC-01 /071 W

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R 211311Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3883

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

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6. THE POLITICIANS AND RALLIERS. ALIST OF EVERY  
LEADER WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE LARGE GROUPS OF KHMER RUMDOH  
OR KHMER ROUGE WILLING TO RALLY TO HIM PERSONALLY  
(PROVIDED CERTAIN MONETARY REWARDS OR POLITICAL CHANES  
ARE MADE) WOULD ENCOMPASS VIRTUALLY EVERY WELL KNOWN  
POLITICIAN IN PHNOM PENH. FOLLOWING AS EXAMPLES ARE THE  
CLAIMS VOICED TO THE EMBASSY BY A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP  
OF LEADERS.

7. PRIME MINISTER IN TAM QUITE CLEARLY CONSIDERED HIMSELF  
TO BE THE BEST CANDIDATE TO HEAD THE NATIONAL RALLIER  
EFFORT. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE HAD CONTACT WITH SEVERAL  
INSURGENT GROUPINGS, MOST OF WHICH HE SAYS HAVE, HOWEVER,  
EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO RALLY AS LONG AS LON NOL IS IN  
POWER. IN TAM HAS PRESIDED OVER A CROUPLE OF CEREMONIES  
IN WHICH SMALL GROUPS OF RALLIERS WERE WELCOMED BACK  
INTO THE FOLD, BUT FANK SOURCES HAVE INDICATED THAT THE  
PARTICIPANTS RIGHTFULLY BEONG IN THE REFUGEE RATHER THAN

THE RALLIER CATEGORY. ALTHOUGH THE MINISTER FOR NATIONAL CONCORD AND RALLIERS IS AN IN TAM MAN, THE PRIME MINISTER APPARENTLY MAKES LITTLE USE OF THIS INSTITUTION, PREFERRING TO OPERATE ON HIS OWN. MINISTER RAY LOMUTH  
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TOLD US, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IN TAM HAS SENT RALLIERS TO THE MINISTRY'S REEDUCATION CENTER AT PEAL KHE (SEE BELOW) BUT THESE DO NOT FALL UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MINISTRY. IN TAM'S RALLIERS THERE HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN FORMED INTO A "COMPANY" AND RALLIERS ALSO ARE SEAD TO CONSTITUTE PART OF THE 1,500 MEN IN TAM HAS RECRUITED FOR THE REPUBLICAN POLICE. IT WOULD PERHAPS NOT BE AN EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT IN TAM'S RALLIER ACTIVITIES ARE PARTIALLY AIMED AT CREATING A PARAMILITARY FORCE PERSONALLY LOYAL TO HIM.

8. HIGH POLITICAL COUNCIL MEMBER CHENG HENG TELLS US THAT HE HAS THROUGH A PERSONAL AGENT MADE CONTACT WITH TWO KHMER ROUGE LEADERS OF SOME 20,000 PEASANTS AND ARMED SOLDIERS IN THE BATTAMBANG AREA. THE LEADERS, WHOSE NAMES CHENG HENG WAS UNABLE TO FURNISH, MADE RALLYING CONDITIONAL TO LON NOL'S LEAVING THE COUNTRY AND APPARENTLY SOUGHT ENTRY TO THE FANK'S PAYROLL.

9. FORMER PRIME MINISTER (UNDER SIHANOUK) AND JUSTICE MINISTER (UNDER LON NOL) YEM SAMBAUR HAS INTRODUCED EMBASSY OFFICERS TO "INTERMEDIARIES" FOR EIGHT KHMER RUMDOH LEADERS CLAIMING TO COMMAND 58,000 MEN, OF WHOME 40 PCT ARE ARMED, IN THE BATTAMBANG, ODDAR MEACHEY, KOMPONG CHHNANG AND KANDAL AREAS. THE PRICE ASKED, ACCORDING TO THESE "INTERMEDIARIES" IS THAT THE U.S. HELP BRING YEM SAMBAUR TO POWER, PREFERABLY AS PRIME MINISTER.

10. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HANG TUN HAK AND MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT KONG ORN SEEM TO BE COORDINATING WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED THE SOCIO-REPUBLICAN RALLIER EFFORT. THEY STATE THEY HAVE RECEIVED SEVERAL FEELERS FROM PROSPECTIVE RALLIER GROUPS THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES (USUALLY MONKS FROM OCCUPIED AREAS). ONE SUCH GROUP IS A 100-MAN UNIT WHICH OFFERS TO RALLY AT OUDONG. THE LEADER, A MOK IV, WISHES HIS MEN TO BE ACCEPTED INTO THE FANK AS A UNIT AND GIVEN AN AREA TO PROTECTED ALONG THE ROAD THAT LINKS OUDONG WITH KOMPONG SPEU. KONG ORN BELIEVES THIS GROUP TO BE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN RALLYING. ANOTHER GROUP OF 950 ARMED MEN, WHOSE  
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BONA FIDES SEEMED TO KONG ORN TO BE MORE QUESTIONABLE, ALSO WISHES TO RALLY TO FANK AND TO BE STATIONED AS A UNIT ALONG ROUTE 4. THIS UNIT, WHICH IS HEADED BY A SAU YOEUNG, DOES NOT WISH TO RALLY TO THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL CONCORD, KONG ORN ADDED, BECAUSE OF THE RED TAPE AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF THAT ORGANIZATION. THE SOCIO-REPUBLICANS SHARE (AND PERHAPS ORGINATED) THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY AND THEY COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS ONLY WITH LIBERATION AND NATION-BUILDING CHIEF OF STAFF THACK RENG, WHO REPORTEDLY HANDLES RALLIER AFFAIRS FOR THE PRESIDENT.

11. THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL CONCORD. THE MINISTRY OFFICIALLY CHARGED WITH RALLYING IS, OF COURSE, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER BG LON NON, WHO LEFT HIS SUCCESSOR RAY LOMUTH LITTLE MORE THAN A BARE BUILDING. RAY LOMUTH HAS ADDED A FEW SECOND RATE FANK OFFICERS AS STAFF MEMBERS AND, IN A JOINT VENTURE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, A REEDUCATION CENTER HOUSED IN A VILLA OF THE QUEEN MOTHER AT PO PEAL KHE ON THE TONLE SAP SOME TWELVE MILES NORTH OF PHNOM PENH. SINCE RAY LOMUTH TOOK OVER THE MINISTRY IN MAY 1973 ONLY 692 RALLIERS BRINGING WITH THEM A TOTAL OF 67 RIFLES AND 69 GRENADES HAVE BEEN PROCESSED THOUGH THE CENTER. MANY IF NOT MOST OF THESE SEEM TO HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL CONCORD BY FANK UNITS, WHO WISHED THE MINISTRY TO FIND THEM A MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD. FROM 110 TO 115 OF THESE RALLIERS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE PO PEAL KHE REEDUCATION CENTER, WHERE THERE ARE TWO STAFF MEMBERS OF THE MINISTRY.

12. WHILE THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL CONCORED IS BY-PASSED BY THE POLITICAANS AND IS INDAAEQUATELY STAFFED AND FINANCED, IT DOES PERFORM SOME HELPFUL FUNCTIONS. AS PREVIOSSLY NOTED, IT SERVES AS AN EMPLOYMENT AGENCY (ALBEIT NOT A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL ONE) FOR RALLIERS RECEIVED BY OTHERS WHO CANNOT FIND THEM WORK. IT HAS ALSO BECOME THE HOME OF TWO POLITICAL RALLIERS, WHO HAVE IMPARTED VALUABLE INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE KHMER COMMUNIST PARTY, AND MIGHT HOUSE OTHERS SHOULD THEY APPEAR.

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CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PRS-01 DRC-01 /071 W

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R 211311Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3884

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

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#### 15. THE CARE OF RALLIERS

ASIDE FROM SUMS OFFERED FOR WEAPONS BROUGHT OVER (GENERALLY SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN THE BLACK MARKET VALUE), FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR RALLIERS ARE LACKING. THE ONLY SUBSISTENCE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED SPECIFICALLY FOR RALLIERS IS THE FOOD AND LODGING FURNISHED THEM BY THE FANK WHEN THEY ARE BEING DEBRIEFED. AFTERWARDS THEIR PATHS DIVERGE. MANY ARE OF COURSE RECRUITED AND SOME SEEM TO HAVE BEEN CONSCRIPTED INTO THE FANK. OTHERS ARE PLACED IN THE HANDS OF THE LOCAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATORS, WHO GENERALLY INCLUDE THEM UNDER WHATEVER REFUGEE PROGRAMS EXIST IN THE AREA. A FEW ARE HANDLED OVER THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL CONCORD, WHICH SENDS THEM TO ITS REEDUCATION CENTER OR ATTEMPTS TO FIND THEM EMPLOYMENT. MOST SEEM TO FIND REFUGE WITH RELATIVES AND FRIENDS, THE TRADITIONAL KHMER MANNER OF HANDLING THE UNFORTUNATE.

16. NOT ONLY LON NON BUT SEVERAL OTHER POLITICIANS HAVE PUT FORTH PROJECTS FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF RALLIERS. THE FACT THAT ALL SUCH PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL FORTUNES (POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL) OF THEIR FORMULATORS HAS PREVENTED THEIR RECEIVING APPROVAL FROM PARLIAMENT OR THE CABINET (EXCEPT  
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FOR A VERY SMALL PILOT PROJECT WHICH EXITED WITH LON NON). THERE IS IN ANY EVENT A STRONG ARGUMENT AGAINST SPECIFIC RELIEF AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS FOR RALLIERS. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS SET FORTH CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFYING RALLIERS, IN ACTUAL PRACTICE IT HAS PROVED ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ASSURE THAT A DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN RALLIERS AND REFUGEES. THE MOST PRACTICAL MANNER OF HELPING UNEMPLOYED RALLIERS THUS SEEMS TO ASSURE THAT THEY

ARE INCLUDED IN REFUGEE RELIEF PROGRAMS.

17. THE U.S. ROLE

ALTHOUGH THE U.S. HAS BEEN ASKED BY A NUMBER OF POLITICAL LEADERS TO HELP FINANCE A RALLIER PROGRAM, EACH CLEARLY ENVISAGED THE PROGRAM RECOMMENDED NOT AS A NATIONAL, INSTITUTIONALIZED EFFORT BUT AS A PERSONAL POLITICAL VEHICLE. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT POLITICAL LEADERS CAN BE ENTICED TO COOPERATION WITH EACH OTHER OR WITH THE FANK, WHOSE LEADERSHIP THEY REGARD (NOT UNREALISTICALLY) AS POLITICAL COMPETITORS. THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL CONCORD AND RALLIERS IS IN ADDITION LIKELY TO REMAIN LARGELY INEFFECTIVE UNDER ITS PRESENT MANAGEMENT, AND THE CHANCES OF OBTAINING A NEW MINISTER WHO WOULD ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF BOTH THE FANK AND A GOOD NUMBER OF CIVILIAN LEADERS APPEAR SLIGHT. THESE FACTORS COMBINED WITH THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF FRAUD ASSOCIATED WITH THE PAST RALLIER EFFORTS, THE CURRENTLY UNFAVORABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE, OTHER MORE IMPORTANT DEMANDS ON SCARCE ASSISTANCE FUNDS, AND HIGHER PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MISSION'S LIMITED HEADSPACE MAKE U.S. TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR A BROAD, NATION-WIDE RALLIER PROGRAM AN UNATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT.

18. THAT SAID, WE BELIEVE THE KHMER REQUIRE ASSISTANCE IN SORTING OUT THE LIMITED ACTIVITIES THAT THEY ARE AT PRESENT CAPABLE OF UNDERTAKING. WE SHOULD:

(A) TRY TO GET THE GKR TO DOWNPEDAL ITS PRESENT DIFFUSE AND INOPERATIVE CONCEPT OF "RALLYING THE NATION" AND TO CONCENTRATE ON INDIVIDUAL RALLIERS WHO ARE EITHER OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST OR WHO CAN BE REINTEGRATED INTO FANK. THE GKR SHOULD ALSO ABANDON THE CONCEPT OF LARGE UNIT RALLYINGS WHICH ARE ALL BUT IMPOSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE AND EXECUTE.

(B) FOCUS RESPONSIBILITY FOR RALLYING AT PROVINCIAL AND MILITARY  
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SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL, WHICH SHOULD HAVE CLEAR GUIDELINES ON INDUCEMENT, IDENTIFICATION, RECEIPT, INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION, AND INTEGRATION INTO FANK. AT THE APPROPRIATE POINT THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL CONCORD SHOULD BE WOUND UP. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY SHOULD ASSUME THE FUNCTION OF FINANCING REGIONAL RALLYING EFFORTS AND OF ADMINISTERING THE GUIDELINES. THE PROGRAM AS WE ENVISAGE IT WOULD BE MODEST BOTH IN FINANCING AND IN MANNING. PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES SHOULD ALSO HAVE A DIRECT LINE TO FANK J-2 FOR THE INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION OF RALLIERS.

(C) CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT THROUGH BIG SHOW AND MAP PROGRAM TO HIGHLY FOCUSED TACTICAL LEAFLET OPERATIONS, AIRBORNE LOUD SPEAKERS AND OTHER TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE EFFORTS;

(D) HELP FANK VERIFY THE BONA FIDES OF ENEMY UNITS OR  
LEADERS SEEKING NEGOTIATIONS.

19. THE PRIMARY MEANS OF ASSISTING GKR RALLIER EFFORTS  
IS, OF COURSE, THROUGH HELPING THE FANK TO BECOME A LARGER,  
A BETTER AND A MORE AGGRESSIVE FIGHTING FORCE.  
WITHOUT VICTORIES, AND WITHOUT DEMONSTRATING THE ABILITY TO  
RECOVER AND HOLD TERRITORY, THERE CAN BE LITTLE OR NO HOPE OF  
PERSUADING LARGE NUMBERS OF THE ENEMY TO RALLY.  
ENDERS

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY PERSONNEL, GOVERNMENT OVERTHROW, POLITICAL STABILITY, FANK, MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 21 NOV 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** elyme  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973PHNOM12869  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** PHNOM PENH  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19731120/aaaaaodt.tel  
**Line Count:** 395  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** elyme  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 21 NOV 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <21-Nov-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <04-Jan-2002 by elyme>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** RALLIER ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA  
**TAGS:** PINS, CB  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005